Introduction
Executive Summary
Major Findings
State-owned Media
Direct Access
Campaigning for One Candidate
Preliminary Assessment of the Election Process
Independent Media
Conclusions

1. Introduction

The pres­i­den­tial hope­fuls went on cam­paign­ing dur­ing the mon­i­tored time span. They fin­ished giv­ing their speech­es on the radio and TV, and par­tic­i­pat­ed in tele­vised debates.

2. Executive summary

The pres­i­den­tial cam­paign may have for­mal­ly reached its peak, but it can hard­ly be regard­ed as a con­test between dif­fer­ent polit­i­cal ideas and visions or as a true ‘pres­i­den­tial race’ with com­pet­ing run­ners. The state-owned media gave more atten­tion to the elec­tion. This, how­ev­er, did not change the actu­al shares of air time and space allo­cat­ed to the con­tenders, as the incum­bent con­tin­ued to dom­i­nate the infor­ma­tion field.

No mean­ing­ful com­pe­ti­tion between the can­di­dates entailed a lack of intrigue or sus­pense in the way both state-owned and inde­pen­dent media were cov­er­ing the elec­tion.

The state-owned media quot­ed pre­lim­i­nary assess­ment of the elec­tion as a peace­ful and con­flict-free process.

The inde­pen­dent media focussed on the pres­i­den­tial hope­fuls’ per­son­al­i­ties and their agen­das. Of all the con­tenders oppos­ing the incum­bent, Ms Karatkievič found her­self in the spot­light of media atten­tion, main­ly because of a clash in the oppo­si­tion around giv­ing or with­draw­ing her endorse­ment.

3. Major Findings

3.1 The State-owned Media

The state-owned elec­tron­ic media increased the pro­por­tion of elec­tion-relat­ed sub­jects, as com­pared to the pre­vi­ous mon­i­tored peri­od. For exam­ple, Panara­ma news pro­gramme on Belarus 1 TV sta­tion gave the upcom­ing elec­tion 10% of its total air time (6% in the pre­vi­ous time span), while the weath­er fore­cast received 2,6% of cov­er­age (3% in the pre­vi­ous peri­od) and sports news made up 22% of the total air time (17% dur­ing the pre­vi­ous time span). Sim­i­lar­ly, Nashi Novosti on ONT TV sta­tion, Radyjo­fakt on the 1st Chan­nel of the Nation­al Radio and the oth­er mon­i­tored elec­tron­ic media began to fea­ture the upcom­ing elec­tion more promi­nent­ly.

The same trend could be traced in the state-owned print­ed media. For exam­ple, the Belarus Segod­nia gave Tać­ciana Karatkievič and Siarhiej Haj­dukievič about three times as much space as in the pre­vi­ous mon­i­tored time span.

The gen­er­al trend towards more cov­er­age of the pres­i­den­tial can­di­dates and the elec­tion did not, how­ev­er, sig­nif­i­cant­ly change the per­cent­age of air time and space giv­en to the major elec­tion actors.

Mr Lukašen­ka, the incum­bent seek­ing re-elec­tion, remained the dom­i­nant pub­lic fig­ure in the state-owned Belaru­sian media. For exam­ple, he received almost 64% of the total elec­tion cov­er­age in Glavny Efir on Belarus 1 and slight­ly less in Panara­ma on Belarus 1.

The assess­ment of the president’s per­son­al­i­ty and his work did not under­go any changes, as the state-owned media went on pre­sent­ing him for the most part in a pos­i­tive light.

The pres­i­den­tial con­tenders may have received more atten­tion from some state-owned media in absolute terms, but they stood no chance of catch­ing up with the incum­bent. For exam­ple, Nashi Novosti on ONT gave 65% of all the elec­tion actors’ cov­er­age to Mr Lukašen­ka, 4% to Ms Karatkievič, and 3% to both Mr Haj­dukievič and Mr Ula­chovič. We did not trace any notice­able dif­fer­ences in the amount of air time and space the pres­i­den­tial run­ners received in the oth­er state-owned media.

At the same time, a bit less air time and space was giv­en to the CEC, while the share of observers slight­ly went up. The lat­ter were pre­sent­ed in a pre­dom­i­nant­ly pos­i­tive light. How­ev­er, as the OSCE/ODIHR mis­sion pro­duced its first inter­me­di­ate report, the state-owned media also began giv­ing its observers their neg­a­tive assess­ments.

The state-owned media stuck to their tac­tic of ignor­ing the oppo­si­tion.

3.2 Direct Access

Just like at the pre­vi­ous stage of cam­paign­ing, the state-owned print­ed and elec­tron­ic media did not adver­tise the pres­i­den­tial hope­fuls’ address­es to the elec­torate. TV guides pre­sent­ed them sim­ply as Speech­es of Can­di­dates for Pres­i­den­cy of the Repub­lic of Belarus, with­out giv­ing their names. Nei­ther did the TV guides give the names of the can­di­dates who took part in the tele­vised debate on 3 Octo­ber. Mean­while, the same TV guide men­tioned the names of the char­ac­ters of a Russ­ian crime series Ulit­sy razbitykh fonarey (The Streets of Smashed Lamps): ‘Two peo­ple who lived in the same block of flats, busi­ness­man Semy­onov and PT teacher Kopeykin, are killed.’

One of the pres­i­den­tial run­ners, name­ly the incum­bent, refused to address the vot­ers or to par­tic­i­pate in the debates. Dur­ing his vis­it to Belaru­sian Met­al Works in Žlobin Mr Lukašen­ka said by way of explain­ing his deci­sion, ‘Well, there’s noth­ing new about it, you know. I appear on TV near­ly every day. It’s not a prob­lem… I believe I must some­how respond to process­es that are under way in real life. Why should I sit on the TV screen [sic! – translator’s note] and tell you what our edu­ca­tion and health care will be like?  He who fol­lows me [sic! – translator’s note] and my poli­cies, he knows my atti­tude very well.’ (Glavny Efir on Belarus 1, 27/09/2015.)

3.3 Campaigning for One Candidate

We have already point­ed out in our reports that the spe­cial TV series called Belarus: the 21st Cen­tu­ry in Glavny Efir on Belarus 1 pre­sent­ed the incum­bent in a pos­i­tive and high­ly pos­i­tive light. The two decades of his pres­i­den­cy were shown as Belarus’ great­est suc­cess sto­ry. The series claims the title of a his­tor­i­cal doc­u­men­tary and has noth­ing to do with how the coun­try leader is per­form­ing his cur­rent office duties. Nor does it mark any impor­tant event in Belarus’ recent his­to­ry.

Panara­ma on Belarus 1 has been show­ing spe­cial items under the head­ing We Did It Togeth­er for over a month already. They present footage of cul­tur­al, social, med­ical, admin­is­tra­tive and sports facil­i­ties mush­room­ing all over Belarus. These items either direct­ly or by their gen­er­al con­text refer to Mr Lukašenka’s twen­ty years’ term in office.

The Naša Niva (23/09/2015) count­ed how often the pres­i­den­tial can­di­dates used cer­tain key words in their pro­grammes. ‘Ali­ak­san­dr Lukašenka’s most fre­quent words are “we/us”,’ says the week­ly. ‘They are used 53 times. Then comes “Belarus” (27 times).’ It has to be point­ed out that anoth­er key word is “TOGETHER”, which is writ­ten in cap­i­tals: ‘TOGETHER we have estab­lished inde­pen­dent Belarus! TOGETHER we will over­come all hard­ships! TOGETHER we will build a hap­py and thriv­ing coun­try!’

Anoth­er tell­tale sign is that a nation­wide cam­paign called We Are Togeth­er has been under way for the last few months. It offers peo­ple liv­ing in dif­fer­ent towns and cities an oppor­tu­ni­ty to ‘sing togeth­er with famous celebri­ties for the whole coun­try to hear’ (http://ont.by/news/our_news/mogilyov-prinimaet-estafety-obschenacionalnoj-akcii-mi-vmeste). The con­certs have been broad­cast on the ONT nation­al TV sta­tion ‘with V‑sign in the colours of the state flag as its logo’.  Pres­i­den­tial can­di­date Tać­ciana Karatkievič has point­ed out that ‘Can­di­date Lukašenka’s cam­paign uses an iden­ti­cal sym­bol.’ (http://nn.by/?c=ar&i=157007).

‘Togeth­er’ is also the key word in a video clip run on Belarus 1 in order to encour­age young vot­ers to go to the polls.

Radyjo­fakt (23/09/2015, the 1st Nation­al Radio Chan­nel) launched a series of inter­views with Belaru­sian researchers pre­sent­ed under the head­ing We Choose Belarus. Polit­i­cal sci­en­tist Ali­ak­siej Dzier­mant spoke on the issues of strength­en­ing Belarus’ sov­er­eign­ty. The key mes­sage was that the gov­ern­ment deserved all cred­it for strength­en­ing state sov­er­eign­ty and main­tain­ing order.

Mr Lukašen­ka as the incum­bent obvi­ous­ly per­son­i­fied the gov­ern­ment. The inter­view had much in com­mon with Belarus: the 21st Cen­tu­ry, which employs the same mod­el of pre­sent­ing the incum­bent in a high­ly pos­i­tive light in the con­text of the last two decades of Belaru­sian sov­er­eign­ty. In a sim­i­lar item in Radyjo­fakt (30/09/2015, the 1st Nation­al Radio Chan­nel) a reporter vir­tu­al­ly quot­ed ver­ba­tim whole para­graphs from the incumbent’s pro­gramme in Belaru­sian trans­la­tion.

Reporter: ‘The idea of giv­ing every per­son an oppor­tu­ni­ty to earn a decent liv­ing from their work has always formed the basis of the Belaru­sian eco­nom­ic mod­el. For this rea­son, dur­ing the times of world eco­nom­ic crises, which Belarus has expe­ri­enced more than once since the ear­ly 1990s, it has been the top pri­or­i­ty in state poli­cies to keep enter­pris­es run­ning and main­tain jobs for peo­ple. This approach has not changed now that the world econ­o­my is again going through hard times.’

Can­di­date Ali­ak­san­dr Lukašenka’s pro­gramme: ‘The idea of giv­ing every per­son an oppor­tu­ni­ty to earn a decent liv­ing from their work has laid the foun­da­tions of the Belaru­sian eco­nom­ic mod­el from the very begin­ning. It has always been the top pri­or­i­ty in our poli­cies to keep enter­pris­es run­ning and main­tain jobs for peo­ple, despite any cri­sis.’

Reporter: ‘So the coun­try lead­er­ship is already mak­ing plans for the future. Three strate­gic goals have been set in the eco­nom­ic field: zero unem­ploy­ment, export and invest­ments. Zero unem­ploy­ment means social sta­bil­i­ty, when every­one can earn their liv­ing. Export means a sta­ble econ­o­my, with strong nation­al cur­ren­cy and low infla­tion, and invest­ments mean devel­op­ment.’

Can­di­date Ali­ak­san­dr Lukašenka’s pro­gramme: ‘Zero unem­ploy­ment means social sta­bil­i­ty and well­be­ing, when every­one can earn their liv­ing from their work. Export means a sta­ble econ­o­my, strong nation­al cur­ren­cy, low infla­tion and a bal­anced bud­get. Invest­ments mean the country’s devel­op­ment, new tech­nolo­gies and a new stan­dard of qual­i­ty of life for each Belaru­sian cit­i­zen.’

Reporter: ‘It is expect­ed that all these mea­sures, i.e. effec­tive state gov­ern­ment com­bined with pri­vate ini­tia­tive and the Belaru­sian people’s ded­i­cat­ed work will ensure a new eco­nom­ic break­through for our coun­try in the near­est future.’

Can­di­date Ali­ak­san­dr Lukašenka’s pro­gramme: ‘The com­bi­na­tion of all the above­men­tioned mea­sures will ensure a new eco­nom­ic break­through for our coun­try, as effec­tive state gov­ern­ment com­bines with pri­vate ini­tia­tive and our people’s ded­i­cat­ed work.’

Last but not least, one of the news items on Nashi Novosti (29/09/2015, ONT) fea­tured a 16-year-old Belaru­sian athlete’s record in a pow­er-lift­ing com­pe­ti­tion. Reporter: ‘The cap­i­tal city of Spain will remem­ber Ali­ak­san­dra not only for her achieve­ments in sport. The girl appeared in Madrid wear­ing a high­ly dis­tinc­tive T‑shirt.’ Then there was footage of the ath­lete in the gym, in which she undid her jack­et to reveal a T‑shirt with a por­trait of Mr Lukašen­ka and a cap­tion, ‘Alexan­der Lukashenko. The Pow­er­ful Pres­i­dent of the Pow­er­ful Coun­try.’ ‘It was my idea,’ said the ath­lete, ‘because I respect Alexan­der Grig­o­rye­vich. He is a pow­er­ful man. I respect his poli­cies.’ We did not trace any instances of cam­paign­ing for any oth­er pres­i­den­tial run­ner in the news pro­gramme.

These instances meet the def­i­n­i­tion of media effects, or in oth­er terms, cam­paign­ing covert­ly or overt­ly for one of the can­di­dates.

3.4 Preliminary Assessment of the Election Process

The state-owned media drew their atten­tion to the fol­low­ing pre­lim­i­nary assess­ments of the pres­i­den­tial cam­paign. ‘The present cam­paign is much more peace­ful,’ said Prof Chris­t­ian Haerpfer of Aberdeen Uni­ver­si­ty. ‘It is a suc­cess­ful cam­paign that meets the inter­na­tion­al stan­dards for elec­tions.’ (Glavny Efir, 20/09/2015: Belarus viewed by experts of the Dia­logue of Civil­i­sa­tions.)

‘The pres­i­den­tial cam­paign strict­ly meets the leg­is­la­tion,’ said Mr Sergey Lebe­dev, the Head of the CIS Elec­tion Mon­i­tor­ing Mis­sion. ‘As for high ten­sion in the run-up to the elec­tion, well, when it is absent, it is evi­dence of social sta­bil­i­ty.’ (Panara­ma on Belarus 1, 21/09/2015.)

3.5 The Independent Media

www.naviny.by focussed on the can­di­dates’ per­son­al­i­ties and agen­das, giv­ing them pos­i­tive, neu­tral and neg­a­tive cov­er­age. Mr Ula­chovič and Ms Karatkievič received the largest shares of elec­tion-relat­ed space – 24% and 16%, respec­tive­ly. Mr Lukašen­ka and Mr Haj­dukievič both got only a mod­est 6% each. The cov­er­age of the oth­er elec­tion actors showed a marked down­ward trend.

In terms of space, the Nar­o­d­na­ja Volia gave the most exten­sive cov­er­age to two can­di­dates, name­ly Mr Lukašen­ka (13%) and Ms Karatkievič (9%), as well as the oppo­si­tion (23%).

The Naša Niva week­ly most often fea­tured Mr Lukašen­ka (52%) and Ms Karatkievič (25%), pre­sent­ing them in a neu­tral and neg­a­tive light.

The Kom­so­mol­skaya Prav­da v Belorus­sii wrote about all the can­di­dates in a neu­tral tone and even­ly dis­trib­uted its space between them.

Although these media gave more cov­er­age to some can­di­dates than the oth­ers, they did not sup­port any pres­i­den­tial hope­ful in par­tic­u­lar.

4. Conclusions

The find­ings received dur­ing the mon­i­tored time span sub­stan­ti­ate our pre­lim­i­nary con­clu­sions that there has been no sig­nif­i­cant change in the mode of elec­tion cov­er­age by the state-owned media. It still aims to pro­mote only one run­ner for pres­i­den­cy, name­ly the incum­bent. This mode invari­ably under­mines the polit­i­cal impor­tance of pres­i­den­tial elec­tions and hin­ders com­pe­ti­tion between polit­i­cal ideas and agen­das, so the elec­tion turns into a ‘low-key’ event that is ‘free from ten­sion’. As oppo­nents of the cur­rent regime are mar­gin­alised, going to the polls becomes a mean­ing­less rit­u­al, in which ‘vot­ers per­form their hon­orary pub­lic duty,’ to quote an old Sovi­et cliché.